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IN RE SEALED CASE:
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-
TILL DEATH DO US PART?
I. INTRODUCTION
"I cannot represent you effectively unless I know everything. I will
hold all our conversations in the strictest of confidence. Now please tell
me the whole story."I These words capture the essence of the attorney-
client privilege-a privilege long recognized as one of the cornerstones of
the legal profession.
2
The courts first recognized the attorney-client privilege over four cen-
turies ago in Elizabethan England.3 U.S. courts have accepted the privi-
lege since the earliest days of the republic. 4 Since that time, the privilege
1. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
2. See In reSealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that "[t]he
vitality of the adversary system is of great concern to us, as it is to all courts, and we
have due regard for the importance of privilege in maintaining that vitality");
United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that
"the attorney-client privilege is central to the legal system and the adversary pro-
cess"); 8 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2291, at 546 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961) (stating that attorney-client privilege is justified because
"'all people and all courts have looked upon th[e] confidence between the party
and attorney to be so great that it would be destructive to all business if attornies
were to disclose the business of their clients'" (quoting Annesley v. Earl of Angle-
sea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1129, 1225, 1241 (Ex. 1743)); David A. Nelson, Comment,
Attorney-Client Privilege and Procedural Safeguards: Are They Worth the Costs , 86 Nw. U.
L. REv. 368, 384 n.127 (1992) (noting that "'[t]he attorney-client privilege has
long been recognized as essential to a proper administration ofjustice'" (quoting
A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)). One commentator
asserted:
Our adversary system of litigation casts the lawyer in the role of fighter for
the party whom he represents. A strong sentiment of loyalty attaches to
the relationship, and this sentiment would be outraged by an attempt to
change our customs so as to make the lawyer amenable to routine exami-
nation upon the client's confidential disclosures regarding professional
business.
CHARLES McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 87, at 205-06 (3d ed. 1984).
3. See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 542-43 (noting that privilege dates
back to reign of Queen Elizabeth I and citing various cases from sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries to support contention that privilege already appeared to be
"unquestioned"); James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8
VILL. L. REV. 279, 288-89 (1963) (stating that privilege was recognized during reign
of Queen Elizabeth I).
4. See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. 280, 294 (1826) (stating general rule that
"confidential communications between client and attorney, are not to be revealed,
at any time"); Hart v. Thompson's Ex'r, 15 La. 88, 93 (1840) (stating that attorney
cannot be compelled to disclose communications of deceased client concerning
dispositions in client's will).
(285)
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has effectively conferred a means of protection against the forced disclo-
sure of confidential legal discussions between lawyers and clients.5
The exact scope of the privilege, however, has recently become the
focus of heated scholarly debate. 6 This debate stems from the fact that
although the privilege encourages open discussion between clients and
their counsel, it simultaneously obstructs the search for truth and the at-
tainment of justice. 7 Consequently, the courts have concluded that the
5. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (stating that
"[c] onfidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal
assistance are privileged" (citing WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2292, at 554)); United
States v. GrandJury Investig., 401 F. Supp. 361, 369 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (asserting that
foundation of attorney-client privilege is to assure that clients who seek advice
from their attorneys will "be completely free of any fear that [their] secrets will be
uncovered").
6. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 3, at 286 (proposing that privilege be re-
stricted to "face-to-face dealings" between attorney and client); Geoffrey C. Haz-
ard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061,
1063 (1978) (discussing impact of crime-fraud exception and tort exception upon
attorney-client privilege); Fred D. Heather, Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A New Ap-
proach, 4 HoFsTI L. REv. 685, 685 (1976) (arguing that conflict between confiden-
tiality and achievement of justice is not inherently contradictory); Charles A.
Miller, Comment, The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REv. 262,
262-66 (1963) (discussing regulatory agency's challenge to attorney-client privilege
and agency's insistence that its investigatory activities be allowed to proceed with-
out obstruction by privilege); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balanc-
ing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 486-87 (1977) (arguing
that balancing test should be applied to determine if attorney-client privilege ap-
plies, although interests will vary depending on whether case involves individual or
corporate clients and whether case is civil or criminal).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (noting that one
effect of attorney-client privilege is withholding of information from fact finder);
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (asserting that testimonial privi-
leges "contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public ... has a right to
every man's evidence"' (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950));
In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) (noting that privilege withholds
evidence from factfinder); see also WIGMOE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554 (recogniz-
ing that attorney-client privilege is "an obstacle to the investigation of the truth");
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1485 (1966) (asserting that "[t]he privilege of confidentiality
between lawyer and client is a significant barrier to the search for truth and the
attainment of justice").
Some commentators have criticized the attorney-client privilege as establish-
ing a shelter for the guilty because the disclosure of communications by an inno-
cent client would not be damaging. See CHARLEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 6.1, at 246-47 (1986) (citing 7JERMv BENTArAM'S WoRImS 473-75 (U. Bowr-
ing ed., 1843)). One scholar argues, however, that this argument is too simplistic
because it presumes that clients are either entirely innocent or entirely guilty. See 2
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181, at 304
n.16 (2d ed. 1994) (criticizing Bentham's argument that attorney-client privilege
establishes shelter for guilty). Moreover, Bentham's argument fails to consider the
possibility that some clients may be victims of incriminating circumstances that
they would not want disclosed. See id. (noting that privilege also protects those
who are not entirely innocent or guilty).
[Vol. 43: p. 285
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/9
privilege should be narrowly construed.8 Moreover, in recent years, a
trend is emerging in which the courts are finding that the privilege pro-
tects fewer and fewer communications because its invocation occasionally
hampers the judiciary's truth-finding function.9
For centuries, however, one aspect of the attorney-client privilege that
has remained largely unchanged is the applicability of the privilege follow-
ing a client's death.10 Courts have generally held that the privilege applies
regardless of whether the client is living or deceased.1 1 The courts recog-
8. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 (stating that attorney-client privilege "applies
only where necessary to achieve its purpose"); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
710 (1974) ("Whatever their origins, the[ ] exceptions to the demand for every
man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth."); United States v. Oloyede, 982 F.2d 133, 141
(4th Cir. 1992) (stating that privilege must be narrowly construed); In re Grand
Jury Matter, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. White, 970
F.2d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir.
1992) (same); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414,
1423 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604
F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that privilege must be narrowly construed
and may be voluntarily waived); United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th
Cir. 1977) (stating that "the privilege is to be applied only when necessary to
achieve its purpose of encouraging clients to make full disclosure to their attor-
neys" see also WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2291, at 554 (noting that, because privilege
frustrates truth-finding process, it should "be strictly confined within the narrowest
possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle"). But see Lohman v. Supe-
rior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173 (Ct. App. 1978) (asserting that attorney-client
privilege "'should be regarded as sacred"' (quoting People v. Kor, 277 P.2d 94, 100
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (Shinn, J., concurring))); State v. Tensley, 249 N.W.2d
659, 661 (Iowa 1977) (stating that privilege has been given "a liberal
construction").
9. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir.
1997) (refusing to recognize governmental attorney-client privilege when govern-
ment official fears he or she may have violated criminal laws and confides in gov-
ernment attorney); Georgia Pac. Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ.
5125, 1996 WL 29392, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (holding that attorney-client
privilege was inapplicable because attorney acted as both negotiator and advisor
on contract at issue and that New York privilege law did not protect attorney's
business judgments).
10. See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 94, at 227 (noting that "[t]he accepted
theory is that the protection afforded by the privilege will in general survive the
death of the client"); ScoTr N. STONE & RONALD S. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVI-
LEGES § 1.19, at 34 (1983) (stating that general rule is that privilege survives death
of client); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2323, at 630-31 (contending that "[i]t has...
never been questioned . . . that the privilege continues even after the end of the
litigation or other occasion for legal advice and even after the death of the client").
11. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 94, at 227 (recognizing generally accepted
principle that privilege will survive client's death); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2323,
at 630 (asserting that "there is no limit of time beyond which the disclosures might
not be used to the detriment of the client or of his estate"); Simon J. Frankel, The
Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the Client, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 46
(1992) (stating that "[c]ourts have generally, though not uniformly, held that the
privilege continues to live whether or not the client does"); see also MODEL RULES
OF PROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995) ("A lawyer shall not reveal the infor-
1998] NOTE
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nize a single exception to post death application of the privilege. 12 This
exception involves cases dealing with interpretation of wills or other testa-
mentary-related disputes.
13
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
stricted the scope of the attorney-client privilege further by creating a new
qualification to the privilege when it decided In re Sealed Case.14 At issue in
this case was whether the privilege automatically survives the death of a
client when criminal litigation is pending. 15 The D.C. Circuit broke new
legal ground by employing a balancing test to support its conclusion that
the privilege did not apply in a criminal case after the death of the cli-
ent.16 The dissent, however, vigorously objected to such a balancing test,
mation relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation.").
12. See Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 406 (1897) (concluding that communi-
cations between decedent and attorney not privileged in suit between devisees who
are claiming under decedent's will); Mehus v. Thompson, 266 N.W.2d 920, 923
(N.D. 1978) (abrogating privilege when dispute is between parties claiming under
decedent's will).
13. See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 94, at 227-29 (discussing testamentary ex-
ception to attorney-client privilege and explaining various approaches used to nul-
lify privilege in testamentary cases); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2329, at 639-40
(noting that deceased client's executor or administrator can waive privilege);
WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 6.3, at 256 (noting that exception does not apply to will-
drafting attorney after client's death when lawyer's testimony involves preparation
of will and litigation is between claimants "under and against the will"); Frankel,
supra note 11, at 73-78 (describing testamentary exception to privilege). For a
more detailed discussion of the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege, see infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
In addition to the testamentary exception, several other exceptions to the at-
torney-client privilege exist. Under the crime-fraud exception, the privilege does
not apply when the client asks his or her attorney for assistance in carrying out
future crimes or fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that privilege terminates when client consults attorney seeking advice
that will further intended or ongoing criminal activity). Under the common repre-
sentation exception, the privilege may be inapplicable to a dispute between multi-
ple clients who were originally on the same side of a transaction. See, e.g., Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that when corporation
seeks advice from legal counsel, and information obtained from counsel relates to
subject matter of later suit brought by minority shareholder in corporation, corpo-
ration is not entitled to claim privilege against its own shareholder). Lastly, the
charge against the attorney exception holds that the privilege does not apply when
the attorney and client become involved in a dispute between themselves regard-
ing services provided by the attorney. See, e.g., Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d
326, 327 n.1 (1967) (stating rule that client waives privilege by attacking attorney's
performance "seems to have been adopted unanimously by those courts which
have dealt with the question").
14. 124 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
15. See id. at 231 (deciding whether attorney-client privilege should be abro-
gated when disclosure of attorney-client communications might provide significant
evidence in criminal proceedings after death of client).
16. See id. at 234 (concluding that balancing test should be employed in cases
involving criminal proceedings after death of client when evidence would other-
wise be difficult to obtain).
288
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and contended that the attorney-client privilege cannot be overcome by a
showing of need for evidence in a criminal proceeding.
1 7
This Note focuses on the refusal of the D.C. Circuit to uphold the
attorney-client privilege in a nontestamentary context. Part II of this Note
discusses the history and policies behind the attorney-client privilege that
influenced the court in its decision to limit the privilege. 18 Next, Part III
presents the facts and procedural history of Sealed Case.19 Part 1V analyzes
the D.C. Circuit's reasoning and evaluates whether the court's abrogation
of the privilege in the instant case was justified.20 Finally, Part V of this
Note discusses the possible effects that the D.C. Circuit's holding may have
on the governance of lawyer-client relations and suggests that the D.C.
Circuit's creation of a limited exception to the attorney-client privilege was
inappropriate. 2
1
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History, Policy and Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege
1. The History of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest evidentiary privi-
leges.22 Traceable back to Roman civil law, the privilege had become
firmly established in the courts of England by the middle of the sixteenth
century. 23 The early English rationale for the privilege was grounded in
the belief that the oath and honor of the barrister and attorney protected
17. See id. at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no case law sup-
porting use of balancing test and emphasizing that attorney-client privilege cannot
be defeated by showing of need). For a further discussion ofJudge Tatel's dissent,
see infra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the legal precedent that the D.C. Circuit analyzed in
arriving at its holding, see infra notes 22-90 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the facts and the procedural history of Sealed Case, see
infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
20. For an analysis of the majority's reasoning in Sealed Case, see infra notes
100-17, 130-61 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of how the D.C. Circuit's decision will impact future cases
dealing with the posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, see infra
notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
22. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (discussing his-
tory of attorney-client privilege); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320
F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1963) (providing history of privilege and noting it was
recognized by courts in Elizabethan England); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D. Del. 1985) (noting that privilege dates back to
sixteenth-century England).
23. See WIGMoRE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 542-43 (noting that privilege dates
back to reign of Queen Elizabeth I, when it appeared to be unquestioned, and
citing various sixteenth-and seventeenth-century cases); Gardner, supra note 3, at
288-89 (noting that Roman law influenced establishment of attorney-client privi-
lege and that privilege was widely recognized during reign of Queen Elizabeth I
"almost contemporaneously with the creation by statute of the general rule of com-
pulsion"); Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CAL. L. REv. 487, 488 (1928) (discussing early Roman law providing that
5
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them from being compelled to disclose the secrets of the client.24 The
emphasis on the code of honor, however, has long since subsided. 25 Con-
sequently, modern courts instead focus almost exclusively upon the appre-
hensions and concerns of the client.26
2. The Underlying Policies of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Utilitarianism vs.
Nonutilitarianism
Supporters of the modern attorney-client privilege offer two distinct
justifications for the privilege. 27 The first and most widely accepted argu-
ment for the privilege has become known as the "utilitarian" approach. 28
The Supreme Court of the United States adopted this approach when it
explained that the privilege is vital "to encourag[ing] full and frank com-
advocates could not be called as witnesses against their clients when trial was in
progress).
Although the privilege was first recognized in sixteenth-century England,
some scholars contend that the scope and conditions of the privilege were not
established until more than two centuries later. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KEN-
NETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5472, at 71-77 (1986) (ar-
guing that Wigmore's historical account of privilege is oversimplified and
inaccurate); Gardner, supra note 3, at 289 (stating that "though the privilege was
thus early established, the ... scope and conditions of the privilege were not set-
fled until after the middle of the nineteenth century"); Hazard, supra note 6, at
1070 (arguing that recognition of privilege was slow and halting well into nine-
teenth century).
24. See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 543 (stating that privilege was origi-
nally grounded in "a consideration for the oath and the honor of the attorney" rather
than out ofjudiciary's concern for client). But see Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing
Negative Inferences upon Claim of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1355,
1360-61 (1995) (arguing that attorney-client privilege may have originated as prod-
uct of privilege against self-incrimination); Developments in the Law-Privileged Com-
munications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1502 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Commu-
nications] (arguing that historians cannot agree on why courts originally recog-
nized privilege).
25. See WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 6.1.2, at 243 (discussing shift away from early
notion of "gentleman's honor" rationale of privilege).
26. See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 87, at 204 (stating that emphasis on code
of honor had yielded by eighteenth century to concerns for client and ascertain-
ment of truth); WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 543 (contending that oath and
honor rationale of privilege "was entirely repudiated" by last quarter of 1700s);
WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 6.1.2, at 243 (stating that "It] he modern rationale is that
the privilege serves the interests of clients in obtaining effective legal advice");
Frankel, supra note 11, at 49 (noting that "the present-day privilege is firmly rooted
in concerns oriented towards the client"), Michael D. Marrs, Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 46 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 54, 54 (1969) (stating that "[a]s the privilege developed
the theory of exclusion became more concentrated upon the apprehensions of the
client").
27. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 49-55 (discussing utilitarian and privacy ra-
tionales for privilege); Privileged Communications, supra note 24, at 1502-04 (discuss-
ing schism between utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifications for privilege).
28. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 49-50 (stating that utilitarian approach is
most widely accepted approach); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74
IOWA L. REv. 351, 358 (1989) (asserting that utilitarian-type rationale is primary
argument in favor of attorney-client privilege).
[Vol. 43: p. 285
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munication between attorneys and clients."29 The utilitarian approach is
premised upon the notion that a client will be more amenable to engage
in an open discussion with his or her attorney if a client is assured that the
conversation will not be subject to disclosure. 30 Because a client will be
more inclined to disclose all information, both favorable and unfavorable,
the lawyer will have the information necessary to properly defend or pro-
mote the client's case. 31 Consequently, the adversarial system of justice
will function more effectively if clients are assured that they can confide
fully in their counsel without the fear that their secrets will be revealed.3 2
Under the utilitarian rationale, the exclusion of otherwise obtainable
evidence is justified on the grounds that the justice system as a whole will
29. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
30. See Zacharias, supra note 28, at 358 (contending that clients may not em-
ploy attorneys or may not be forthcoming in revealing information if client is not
assured of confidentiality). One early court has contended: "'If the privilege did
not exist at all, everyone would be thrown upon his own legal resources. Deprived
of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skillful per-
son, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case."' WIGMORE, supra note
2, § 2291, at 546 (quoting Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620 (Ch.
1833)).
The degree to which the privilege actually encourages the client to reveal sen-
sitive information to his or her attorney has been the subject of academic dispute
for some time. See Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An
Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV. 893, 924-
25 (1982) (noting that patients of psychotherapists will still reveal sensitive infor-
mation to psychotherapist regardless of whether privilege exists); Comment, Func-
tional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the
Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1231-32 (1962) (suggesting
that correlation between existence of privilege and client's willingness to be candid
with attorney is weak).
31. See In re Shangel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that privilege
"'encourag[es] clients to make the fullest disclosure to their attorneys [and there-
fore] enables the latter to act more effectively, justly, and expeditiously"' (quoting
2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, EVIDENCE § 503(02) (1982))); see also
Bartel, supra note 24, at 1365 (noting that lawyer who knows all relevant informa-
tion will be better prepared in assisting and advising client).
32. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.
Mass. 1950) (contending that attorney-client privilege is essential for procuring
effective legal advice and consequently "'[t]he social good derived from the
proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is believed
to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of the evidence in
specific cases'" (quoting MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 210 cmt. (1942))).
One commentator explains the utilitarian rationale in terms of a three-step
syllogism. See Zacharias, supra note 28, at 358. The first part of the syllogism is that
for the adversary system to function, citizens need lawyers to resolve their disputes
and lawyers need to be able to represent their clients effectively. See id. (discussing
needs of client and lawyer in adversary system). Part two of the syllogism proposes
that attorneys can be effective only if they are provided with all of the relevant
facts. See id. (describing attorney's need for all pertinent information). Finally,
clients may not employ attorneys, or at least not provide them with adequate infor-
mation, unless the client is assured that the relationship will remain confidential.
See id. (discussing adverse effects if clients are not assured of confidentiality in their
dealings with their attorneys).
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benefit from the privilege. 33 Thus, the protection provided by the privi-
lege extends beyond the individual client to society at large.34 As the
Supreme Court stated, "[t]he privilege recognizes that sound legal advice
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends
upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."35
The second justification for the privilege has been classified as the
"nonutilitarian" or "rights-based" rationale.36 Unlike the utilitarian ration-
ale, the nonutilitarian rationale focuses on the clients as individuals rather
than on society as a whole. 37 The rights-based rationale contends that the
attorney-client privilege is justified because it protects both the privacy and
the dignity of the client. 38 The core of this justification rests upon the
belief that it is "intrinsically wrong" for courts to compel revelation of at-
torney-client confidences in specific circumstances.3 9 Underpinning this
33. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 72, at 171 (stating that privilege protects
"interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient
social importance to justify some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the
administration of justice").
34. See Privileged Communications, supra note 24, at 1505 (noting that utilita-
rian rationale focuses "not on the benefits produced during particular lawsuits, but
on the aggregate benefits that accrue from having the privilege in all court cases").
35. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
36. See Bartel, supra note 24, at 1363-64 (describing nonutilitarian rationale
for privilege); see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5472, at 77 (terming
nonutilitarian approach as "noninstrumental" approach); Frankel, supra note 11,
at 53-55 (focusing on privacy aspect of nonutilitarianism); Privileged Communica-
tions, supra note 24, at 1501 (noting that nonutilitarian rationale often takes form
of theory of rights). One authority contends that the utilitarian and nonutilitarian
rationales are not as distinct and irreconcilable as their proponents contend. See
id. at 1504-09 (suggesting that utilitarian and nonutilitarian rationales can be
combined).
Another justification for the attorney-client privilege associates the privilege
with a categorical imperative. See Brian R. Hood, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege
and a Revised Rule 1.6: Permitting Limited Disclosure After the Death of the Client, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS, 741, 761 (1994). Under this justification, a trusting attomey-cli-
ent relationship is itself the primary, intrinsic value of the principle of confidential-
ity. See id. (arguing that intrinsic value of having good attorney-client relationship
justifies privilege). Consequently, the attorney-client privilege does not lend itself
to interest balancing and should be nearly absolute. See id. (comparing privilege to
notion of categorical imperative that should be absolute except in extraordinary
circumstances).
37. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5472, at 77 (stating that "[u]nlike
the [utilitarian] argument, [the nonutilitarian argument] does not depend on any
assumption or proof of the consequences likely to follow such disclosures"); Fran-
kel, supra note 11, at 55 (noting that focus is not on clients generally, but rather on
clients as individuals).
38. See Bartel, supra note 24, at 1363 (stating that nonutilitarians view attor-
ney-client privilege "as a protection of the right of privacy and as a promotion of
the right of individual independence and autonomy within the confining frame-
work of a given system of laws"); Hood, supra note 36, at 760-61 (noting that pri-
vacy and individual dignity are primary arguments in favor of nonutilitarian
rationale).
39. Privileged Communications, supra note 24, at 1501. One authority suggests
that the crux of the nonutilitarian argument is best expressed by characterizing the
8
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rationale is the notion that "'there are things more important to human
liberty than accurate adjudication.'1,40
3. When the Attorney-Client Privilege Applies
Generally, the attorney-client privilege applies to those confidential
communications between the attorney and the client through which the
client is seeking legal advice. 4 1 The principles of the privilege have been
summarized as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a profes-
sional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communica-
tions relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the pro-
tection be waived.
42
The privilege belongs to the client alone and not to the attorney.
43
Although the privilege protects the attorney from forced disclosure of the
client's confidential communication, the attorney must assert the privilege
on behalf of his or her client whenever it applies.44 Specifically, the privi-
forced disclosure of attorney-client communications as involving a "compulsory
'betrayal.'" See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5472, at 77. According to one
proponent of the nonutilitarian rationale, "it was obvious that 'every feeling of
justice, honour, and humanity would be shocked' by the attorney's revelation of
his client's secrets," and consequently judicial sanction would not change the pub-
lic's disdain for such conduct. Id. (quoting 1 EDwARD LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE
WoRKs 461, 462 (1873)).
40. Frankel, supra note 11, at 55 (quoting DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 110 (2d ed. 1985)).
41. See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1390-91 (4th Cir. 1996) (not-
ing that attorney-client privilege applies only when person seeking legal advice
from attorney is that attorney's client and attorney is acting in his or her profes-
sional capacity), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1842 (1997); MuRL A. LARXIN, FEDERAL TES-
TIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2.02, at 2-11 (1982) (stating that "[t]he privilege arises
whenever legal service, assistance, advice, or opinion is sought from a professional
legal adviser in his/her capacity as and under circumstances that support a finding
of an attorney-client relationship").
42. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2292, at 554. One commentator has noted that
such a summary of the privilege lacks completeness and fails to recognize impor-
tant jurisdictional variations of the privilege. SeeWoLRAM, supra note 7, § 6.3.1, at
250-51 (stating that "[a] ny general encapsulation sacrifices completeness for brev-
ity and overlooks important jurisdictional variations").
43. See WIGMoRE, supra note 2, § 2321, at 629. At early common law, however,
the privilege belonged entirely to the attorney and he or she was free to keep the
communications secret or disclose them as he or she saw fit. See Gardner, supra
note 3, at 289 (discussing attorney's control of privilege under early common law).
44. See WoLFRAM, supra note 7, § 6.3.4, at 253 (noting that "[t]he duty to in-
voke the privilege is one of professional responsibility and does not depend on the
client's independent request to the lawyer to do so"); Nelson, supra note 2, at 385
(stating that "[w] hile the privilege protects the attorney from coerced divulsion of
the client's confidential communication, the attorney has no discretion to decide
whether to exercise the privilege").
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lege is applicable at all stages of all judicial actions, cases and proceedings,
including discovery and grand jury proceedings. 45
B. The Effect of the Client's Death on the Attorney-Client Privilege
1. The General Rule
Before the D.C. Circuit's holding in Sealed Case, both state and federal
courts have consistently applied the common law rule that the privilege
continues to protect the client after the client's death, despite the fact that
harsh consequences may result.4 6 In reJohn Doe Grand Jury Investigation4 7
illustrates the application of the common law rule in a criminal case in
which the client had died before trial. 48 The client shot and killed his
pregnant wife and subsequently spoke with his attorney about the mur-
45. See FED. R. EVID. 1101.1(C) (stating that "[t]he Rule with respect to privi-
leges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings"); see also United
States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that attorney-
client privilege may be applied to summons by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) if
all other conditions of privilege are met); In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553-54
(8th Cir. 1980) (noting that attorney-client privilege generally applies to grand
jury proceedings); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 509 (2d Cir. 1979)
(same).
46. See, e.g., United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that privilege survives termination of attorney-client relationship); United States v.
Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that communications remain
privileged after death of decedent except if such communications pertain to litiga-
tion between parties claiming under testator); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (stating that attorney "is en-
joined for all time . . . from disclosing matters revealed to him by reason of the
confidential relationship"); State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976)
(stating that "[t]he privilege does not terminate with death"); Peyton v. Werhane,
11 A.2d 800, 803 (Conn. 1940) (noting that documents that amounted to confi-
dential communications during existing attorney-client relationship cannot be
compelled from attorney after client's death); Bailey v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co., 179 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 1970) (noting that "the protective
shield provided by [the privilege] generally survives the client's death"); Payne v.
Payne's Adm'r, 161 S.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Ky. 1942) (finding that communication
between attorney and deceased client was not admissible as evidence because com-
munication was privileged); In reJohn Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d
69, 70 (Mass. 1990) ("It is important to note that the attorney-client privilege sur-
vives the client's death."); State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 219 (S.C. 1981) (stating
that "privilege belongs to the client and, unless waived by him, survives even his
death"); Martin v. Shaen, 156 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1945) (noting that "the privi-
lege does not terminate with the cessation of the protected relationship, but con-
tinues thereafter, even after the death of the person to whom the privilege is
accorded").
Nevertheless, the common law rule has been sharply criticized by some com-
mentators. See McCoMIcK, supra note 2, § 94, at 229 (arguing that privilege could
be terminated by client's death without discouraging free communication between
attorney and client); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5498, at 484-86 (oppos-
ing continuation of privilege after death of client).
47. 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990).
48. Id. at 72 (holding that attorney-client privilege remains following death of
client who faced criminal charges).
294
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der.49 Shortly thereafter, the client committed suicide. 50 The prosecu-
tion then filed a motion to compel his attorney to testify before the grand
jury concerning the substance of his interview with the now-deceased
client.5 1
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the attorney
could not be compelled to testify about the conversation with his deceased
client, even though the client was dead and his attorney's testimony could
have alleviated the need for further investigation into the murder. 52 In
reaching this conclusion, the court flatly rejected a balancing approach
that weighs the interests of the deceased with the plaintiff's interests in
disclosure, as adopted by a Pennsylvania court.53
49. See Frances M. Jewels, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege Survives Client's
Death-In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 562 N.E.2d 69
(1990), 25 SUFFOLK U. L. Rv. 1260, 1260-61 (1991) (discussing decedent's involve-
ment in death of his wife). Investigators believed that the decedent killed his wife
to collect on several insurance policies that totaled more than a half-million dol-
lars. See id. at 1261 n.8, 10. Before succumbing to the gunshot wounds, the dece-
dent's wife gave birth to a son, who died 17 days later. See Frankel, supra note 11,
at 45.
50. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69 (noting that decedent met for two hours
with his attorney one day before he committed suicide).
51. See id. (noting that Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed order to compel
decedent's attorney to disclose contents of his interview with decedent). The exec-
utrix of the decedent's estate informed the grand jury that she was not certain
whether she had the right to waive the decedent's privilege, and that if she did
have the power to waive the decedent's privilege, she refused to exercise that
power. See id. For a discussion of waiver of the attorney-client privilege by a de-
ceased client's representative, see WimoRE, supra note 2, § 2329, at 639-41 and
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5498, at 483-86.
52. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 72 (holding that "the attorney-client privilege
should not yield either before or after the client's death to society's interest, as
legitimate as we recognize that interest is, in obtaining every man's evidence").
53. See id. at 70-71 (rejecting balancing test that weighed interests of decedent
against societal interests).
The John Doe court rejected a balancing test employed in Cohen v. Jenkintown
Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 71. In
Cohen, the plaintiff brought suit against a taxi cab company to recover for injuries
that the plaintiff sustained when she was struck by a motor vehicle while crossing
the street. See Cohen, 357 A.2d at 690. There was a question as to whether the
driver of the cab was actually the one responsible for hitting the plaintiff. See id. at
690-91. Following the accident, the driver met with his attorney and informed him
that he was indeed the driver who struck the plaintiff. See id. at 691. After the
meeting, the cab driver died. See id. The court found that the driver's conversa-
tion did not contain "scandalous and impertinent matter" that would tarnish the
memory of the decedent. Id. at 693. The Cohen court also found a need for the
testimony of the decedent's lawyer, because the plaintiff did not see who struck her
in the road and there were no witnesses. Id.
The court in Cohen balanced the interests of the decedent against those of the
plaintiff and found that the decedent's rights, estate or memory would not be
harmed by revealing the contents of the conversation. Id. (applying balancing
test). Consequently, the Cohen court concluded that the privilege should be abro-
gated because of concerns for justice. Id. at 693-94 (stating that "[t] he privilege
exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the
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Although -the Massachusetts court acknowledged that the privilege
frustrates the fact-finding process, it adopted the utilitarian approach. 5 4
The court contended that both the client's and the public's interests are
best served by maintaining the privilege after death. 55 Specifically, the
court explained:
[E]xtraordinarily high value must be placed on the right of
every citizen to obtain the thoughtful advice of a fully informed
attorney concerning legal matters. A rule that would permit or
require an attorney to disclose information given to him or her
by a client in confidence, even though such disclosure might be
limited to the period after the client's death, would in many in-
stances, we fear, so deter the client from "telling all" as to seri-
ously impair the attorney's ability to function effectively.5 6
Similarly, in State v. Macumber5 7 a convicted murderer appealed his
sentence on the grounds that another individual had confessed to the kill-
ings for which the appellant was being tried. 58 The confession was made
to two attorneys who were willing to testify on behalf of the appellant,
because the individual who was said to have confessed had died before
trial.59 The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the decedent's confes-
sion was privileged and disallowed its admission into evidence. 60 In reach-
interests ofjustice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial
judge may require that the communication be disclosed").
The John Doe court argued that Cohen was factually distinguishable from John
Doe. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 71 (noting that "[t) here are clear factual distinc-
tions between the Cohen case and the present matter"). Moreover, the John Doe
court contended that the balancing test of Cohen would create a chilling effect and
impair the attorney's ability to perform effectively. Id. (disagreeing with applica-
tion of balancing test in Cohen).
54. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 70, 71 (recognizing that attorney-client privi-
lege frustrates fact-finding process, but emphasizing that privilege permits attorney
to function effectively and prevents chilling effect on client-attorney
communications).
55. See id. (stating that balancing test proposed by Cohen court "is inconsistent
with the traditional value our society has assigned, in the interests ofjustice, to the
right to counsel and to an effective attorney-client relationship").
56. Id. at 71.
57. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
58. Id. at 1086 (discussing appellant's allegation that another person commit-
ted murders in question). The appellant was found guilty in the trial court of two
counts of first degree murder. See id. at 1085 (noting that appellant was sentenced
to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment as punishment for murders). One
of the crucial items of evidence that connected the appellant to the murders was
the fact that the markings on the .45-caliber shell casings found at the crime scene
allegedly were made by the ejector of a semiautomatic pistol of the same caliber
owned by the appellant. See id. at 1086.
59. See id. (stating that trial court refused evidence finding on basis that dis-
cussion between decedent and lawyers was privileged).
60. See id. (stating that attorney-client privilege is governed by statute and at-
torney is not permitted to waive privilege in this case). The court further noted:
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ing its conclusion, the court stated that unless the client or someone
authorized by law waives the privilege, "[t] he privilege does not terminate
with death."6 1
2. The Testamentary Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege
Despite the general rule that the privilege survives the death of the
client, one notable exception to the posthumous application of the privi-
lege exists-the testamentary exception. 62 This exception arises in cases
involving the validity or interpretation of a will or in other disputes be-
tween parties claiming under and against the testator's will. 63 Glover v.
Patten64 is one of the foremost cases dealing with the testamentary excep-
tion. 65 In a dispute between children claiming under their mother's will,
the United States Supreme Court held that "in a suit between devisees
under a will, statements made by the deceased to counsel respecting the
execution of the will, or other similar document, are not privileged." 66
Justifying the testamentary exception, the Glover Court noted that all
of the parties claimed under the client's will, and therefore, no conflict
between the interests of the decedent and disclosure existed.6 7 The Court
"The legislature has presumably weighed the possibility of hampering justice in
originally providing for the privilege." Id.
61. Id. The court also discussed the testamentary exception to the privilege,
stating that the privilege "has been commonly suspended only in cases where the
communication would be logically thought to further the interests of the deceased
such as a will." Id.
62. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 47 (stating that testamentary exception is
"[Ithe single uniformly recognized exception" to general rule that privilege sur-
vives death of client); see also STONE & LIEBMAN, supra note 10, § 1.19, at 35 (stating
that rationale for privilege is destroyed when will contest or controversy regarding
who shall be decedent's proper successor exists); WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 6.3, at
256 (noting that it is commonly recognized that general rule does not apply to
testimony of will-drafting lawyer after death of client when lawyer's testimony con-
cerns contents of client's will).
63. See McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 94, at 133 (stating that testamentary ex-
ception applies in cases involving validity of will or other dispute between parties
claiming by succession from testator at testator's death); WOLFRAM, supra note 7,
§ 6.3, at 256 (noting that "it is commonly recognized that the privilege does not
apply to testimony by a will-drafting lawyer after a client's death when the lawyer's
testimony concerns the circumstances of the preparation and execution of the cli-
ent's will and the litigation is between claimants under and against the will").
64. 165 U.S. 394 (1897).
65. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, § 94, at 228 n.6 (citing Glover for proposi-
tion that privilege does not apply when all parties claim under deceased client);
Frankel, supra note 11, at 76 (noting that subsequent cases have employed reason-
ing of Glover to develop theory that when all claimants are representatives of de-
ceased, they have essentially waived attorney-client privilege).
66. Glover, 165 U.S. at 406.
67. See id. at 407 (stating that "' [i] n the cases of testamentary dispositions, the
very foundation on which the [privilege] proceeds seems to be wanting; and in the
absence, therefore, of any illegal purpose entertained by the testator, there does
not appear to be any ground for applying it'" (quoting Russell v. Jackson, 68 Eng.
Rep. 558, 560 (Ch. 1851)).
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emphasized, however, that the exception to the privilege is limited and
applies only to those persons who claim through the testator under the
testator's will. 68 Additionally, the Glover Court stated that outside of the
testamentary context, the privilege survives the death of the client. 69
C. The Quest for Certainty and the Supreme Court's Expansion of the
Attorney-Client Privilege
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court took a significant step in
expanding the attorney-client privilege when it decided Upjohn Co. v.
United States.70 In Upjohn, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a corpo-
ration's attorney-client privilege may protect both written and verbal com-
munications between corporate counsel and lower-level employees. 71 In
According to one commentator, the approach that the Glover Court adopted
in upholding the testamentary exception to the privilege is similar to a conception
of an implied waiver. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 76. In an implied waiver situa-
tion in which the dispute is between heirs to the decedent, the opposing claimants
are all representatives of the deceased. See Hood, supra note 36, at 765. Conse-
quently, to effectuate the decedent's will, the parties are considered to have essen-
tially waived the privilege. See id.; see also Olsson v. Pierson 25 N.W.2d 357, 362-63
(Iowa 1946) (holding that privilege can be waived by those who are interested in
maintaining integrity of will); Estate of Hebbeler v. Young, 875 S.W.2d 163, 168
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that either party that claims under decedent can
waive privileged communications between deceased client and client's attorney);
Walton v. Van Camp, 283 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Mo. 1955) (same).
A second rationale for the testamentary exception is premised upon the testa-
tor's intent. See WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2314, at 612-13; Hood, supra note 36, at
765 (discussing intent rationale). The intent rationale presumes that the decedent
would want the attorney-client communications revealed to effectuate the wishes
contained in the will. See id. Consequently, the attorney acts as an agent with
authority to make the communications for the deceased client. See id.; see also Do-
herty v. O'Callaghan, 31 N.E. 726, 727 (Mass. 1892) (holding that attorney should
testify in order for court to ascertain what testamentary instructions were given to
attorney by deceased testator); In re Cunnion's Will, 94 N.E. 648, 650 (N.Y. 1911)
(stating that "after the testator's death, the attorney is at liberty to disclose all that
affects the execution and tenor of the will"); Bergsvik v. Bergsvik, 291 P.2d 724,
731 (Or. 1955) (stating that "it is presumed that the client wanted every material
fact revealed that might aid in giving [the will] effect").
68. See Glover, 165 U.S. at 406 (limiting exception to privilege to persons who
are devisees under decedent's will).
69. See id. (stating that "[w]hile [communications between attorney and de-
ceased client] might be privileged, if offered by third persons to establish claims
against an estate, they are not within the reason of the rule requiring their exclu-
sion, when the contest is between the heirs or next of kin"). Consequently, the
privilege still applies against strangers or outside persons who make claims against
the estate. See id.
70. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
71. Id. at 395 (extending privilege to cover middle-and lower-level corporate
employees). In Upjohn, independent accountants conducting an audit of one of
Upjohn's subsidiaries discovered that Upjohn officials had made possibly illegal
payments to foreign government officials to secure government business. See id. at
386. The corporation subsequently sent a questionaire to "all foreign general and
area managers," asking for detailed information concerning such payments. See id.
at 386-87. The letter, signed by Upjohn's chairman, told the managers that they
[Vol. 43: p. 285
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reaching this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist recognized that the "attorney-
client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communica-
tions known to the common law" and that it applies to individuals as well
as corporations. 72 Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist reassured that the privi-
lege promotes "full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote [s] broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice."7 3 The Court further emphasized
that if an attorney is to become fully informed about his or her client's
case, the privilege must extend to those persons who possess the informa-
tion needed by the corporation's lawyers.74
The Upjohn Court was highly critical of the Sixth Circuit's "control
group" test, which protected communications between corporate counsel
and those employees who were responsible for directing the corporation's
activities. 75 Justice Rehnquist asserted that employees of a corporation
who are not in decision-making positions often possess critical informa-
were to treat the investigation as "highly confidential" and that they were not to
discuss the matters with anyone other than Upjohn employees who possibly could
be helpful in providing the information requested. See id. at 387. Responses were
to be sent directly to the company's general counsel. See id. After Upjohn volunta-
rily submitted a preliminary report to the IRS, which disclosed the questionable
payments, the IRS immediately began an investigation to ascertain the tax conse-
quences of such payments. See id. Upon learning of the existence of the question-
aires, the IRS sought to obtain them by subpoena. See id. at 387-88. Upjohn
refused to produce the responses to the questionaires, arguing that they were pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. See id. at
388.
One authority deems the Upjohn decision a "failure" because the Supreme
Court failed to recognize the theoretical and practical problems that emerge when
a corporation is treated as a client. See WIGrr & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5476,
at 134-92 (providing extensive discussion of difficulties created when corporations
are treated as clients).
72. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-90 (discussing history and applicability of privi-
lege). Justice Rehnquist recognized that difficulties in application of the privilege
arise when the client is a corporation. See id. at 389. Nevertheless, the Court has
already ruled that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation. See id. at
390.
73. Id. at 389.
74. See id. at 391 (recognizing that noncontrol group employees, such as mid-
dle-and lower-level employees, often possess information that corporate counsel
needs to represent corporation effectively).
75. See id. at 391-93 (asserting control group test "frustrates the very purpose
of the privilege"). Among one of the Supreme Court's criticisms of the control
group test is that it places the attorney in a difficult situation. See id. at 391-92
(discussing dilemma faced by corporate attorney). According to the Upjohn Court:
"In a corporation, it may be necessary to glean information relevant
to a legal problem from middle management or non-management per-
sonnel as well as from top executives. The attorney dealing with a com-
plex legal problem 'is thus faced with a "Hobson's choice." If he
interviews employees not having "the very highest authority," their com-
munications to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he inter-
views only those employees with the "very highest authority," he may find
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine what happened.'"
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tion that the corporate counsel needs, and the non-control-group employ-
ees often need legal advice themselves. 76 More importantly, Justice
Rehnquist asserted that the "control group" test was highly unpredictable
because it restricted the availability of the privilege to those employees
who have a "substantial role" in deciding and administering a corpora-
tion's legal response. 77 According to the Court, to effect the purpose of
the attorney-client privilege, both the attorney and the client must have
some assurances in advance whether certain discussions will be pro-
tected.78 As Justice Rehnquist stated, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."
79
Id. at 391-92 (quoting Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 575 F.2d 596, 608-09 (7th Cir.
1978); AlanJ. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege,
12 B.C. INDUS. & COMMERCIAL L. REv. 873, 876 (1971)).
76. See id. (acknowledging lower level employees often possess critical infor-
mation needed by attorney). The Court was well aware that middle- and lower-
level employees can entangle the corporation in serious legal matters. See id. at
391 (noting that noncontrol group employees can embroil corporation in substan-
tial legal problems). Consequently, these employees will often have the pertinent
information needed by the corporation's counsel to defend the corporation. See
id. (discussing amount and value of knowledge of lower-level corporate
employees).
77. See id. at 393 (asserting that control group test is inherently unpredict-
able). Justice Rehnquist supported this conclusion by citing to several lower court
decisions that applied the control group test with varying results. See id. The
Court cited to Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315-16 (N.D. Okla. 1967), which held
that the control group consists of managers and assistant managers of the patent
division and research and development department. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
The Court contrasted the Hogan court's conclusion with that of Congoleum Indus-
tries v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa. 1969), which found that the control
group does not include two directors of the research division or the vice president
of research and production. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. Recognizing the seem-
ingly disparate results reached in these two cases, the Upjohn Court found the con-
trol group test to be unpredictable. See id. (discussing lower courts' inability to
apply control group test consistently).
One commentator contends that the Supreme Court's conclusion regarding
the unpredictability of the control group test is "unfounded." See The Supreme
Court, 1980 Term-Attorney-Client Privilege, 95 HARv. L. REv. 270, 279 (1981) (criti-
cizing Upjohn Court's finding that control group test is unpredictable). This com-
mentator noted: "One cannot prove the unpredictability of a factually based test
by using different results reached under different factual situations." Id.
78. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (stating that "if the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected").
79. Id. Although the Court rejected the control group test, it refused to artic-
ulate a standard that would govern similar cases and provide guidance to corpora-
tions and federal courts. See id. at 396. Nevertheless, the opinion does suggest
limitations in that the privilege will apply if: (1) the information is communicated
for the sole purpose of obtaining legal advice for the corporation; (2) it relates to
the specific corporate duties of the employee providing the information; and (3)
the information is treated as confidential within the corporation itself. See McCoR-
MICK, supra note 2, § 87, at 208 (explaining that Upjohn did establish guidelines for
corporations and lower courts to follow).
[Vol. 43: p. 285
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The Supreme Court expanded testimonial privileges further in Jaffee
v. Redmond.80 In Jaffee, the Court considered whether federal courts
should recognize a privilege that protects communications between psy-
chotherapists and patients, and whether such a privilege, if recognized,
should extend to licensed clinical social workers.8 1 Justice Stevens, writing
for the majority, concluded that "reason and experience" dictated that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege should exist.8 2
Arriving at its conclusion, the Jaffee Court noted that Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes courts to define new privileges ac-
cording to common law principles in light of reason and experience.8 3
The Court maintained that Rule 501 did not freeze the law governing priv-
ileges of witnesses in federal trials as it existed at the time of the rule's
creation, but rather Rule 501 instructed the federal courts to "continue
the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges." 84 Akin to its rea-
80. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
81. Id. at 1928 (stating that issue is whether privilege protecting communica-
tions between patient and psychotherapist "'promotes sufficiently important inter-
ests to outweigh the need for probative evidence"' (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980))).
82. Id. The Court recognized that the privilege poses a barrier to the truth
finding process. See id. at 1928-29 (noting that privilege impedes public's right to
evidence). Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege serves a valid public interest and that its existence should be recognized by the
federal courts. See id. at 1929 (concluding that psychotherapist privilege serves
public interest by providing appropriate treatment for persons suffering effects of
mental or emotional problems). As one commentator surmised, the Jaffee Court's
recognition of a psychotherapist privilege signified that the Court was willing to
ensure the confidentiality of communications between psychotherapists and pa-
tients at the cost of losing additional relevant evidence. See Molly Rebecca Bryson,
Protecting Confidential Communications Between a Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v.
Redmond, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 987-88 (1997).
The Court also concluded that this privilege should extend to licensed social
workers because such professionals provide psychiatric assistance to those who can-
not afford the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931
(arguing that counseling sessions provided by licensed social workers serve same
public goals as those provided by psychotherapists). Specifically, the Court main-
tained that "'[d] rawing a distinction between the counseling provided by costly
psychotherapists and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social
workers serves no discernible public purpose.'" Id. at 1932 (quotingJaffee v. Red-
mond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1358 n.19 (1995), affjd, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996)).
83. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927. Rule 501 provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
84. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927-28 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
47 (1980)). In Trammel, the Court stated that Congress did not intend to freeze
the law of privilege, but rather Congress' purpose was to "provide the courts with
the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis." Tramme4, 445
U.S. at 47.
1998] NOTE
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soning in Upjohn, the Jaffee Court asserted that the privilege does not place
the adversary at a disadvantage, because if the privilege did not exist, there
would be a chilling effect on confidential communications between psy-
chotherapists and their patients.8 5 This chilling effect, in the eyes of the
Jaffee Court, would likely thwart the very existence of the evidence being
sought.
8 6
The recognition that state policy decisions influence whether federal
courts should recognize a new privilege or alter the coverage of an existing
one was central to the Jaffee Court's holding.8 7 According to Justice Ste-
vens, the fact that all fifty states and the District of Columbia had enacted
statutes recognizing some form of psychotherapist privilege made it appro-
priate for the Court to recognize a federal psychotherapist privilege.88
85. SeeJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 (stating that "[i]f the privilege were rejected,
confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would
surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances that give
rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation"). But see United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974) (stating that "we cannot conclude that
[the President's] advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by
the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversa-
tions will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecution").
TheJaffee Court continued the "evolutionary development of testimonial privi-
leges" by noting that effective psychotherapy is contingent upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust. Seejaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928-29 (arguing that confidentiality
is essential to effective psychiatric treatment). The Court maintained that an at-
mosphere of trust and confidence must exist for a patient to make a full disclosure
of potentially embarrassing information. See id. at 1928. The Court thus con-
cluded that confidentiality is a "sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment."
Id. (citing Judicial Conference Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1972)). For a discussion of whether the attorney-client privilege ensures a client's
openness and candor, see supra note 30.
86. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929 (contending that without privilege much of
evidence sought by plaintiffs would likely not have come into existence). In a
harsh dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the role of psychotherapists in modern
society does not justify creation of a specific psychotherapist-patient privilege. See
id. at 1934 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (asserting that most individuals resolve difficulties
at home with family members and noting no existence of mother-child privilege,
yet there now exists psychotherapist-patient privilege). Justice Scalia also noted
that the absence of such a privilege did not preclude patients in previous years
from being candid with their psychotherapists. See id. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (questioning whether "patients [were] paying money to lie to their analysts all
those years" before adoption of privilege).
87. See id. at 1929-31 (noting that policy decisions of states have influenced
Court in deciding to recognize new privilege or modify coverage of existing
privilege).
88. See id. at 1929 (maintaining that adoption of psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege by all 50 states and District of Columbia confirms appropriateness of federal
courts adopting privilege as well). Justice Stevens further argued that if the Court
failed to recognize the privilege, any state's promise of confidentiality might be
rendered worthless if the case reached federal court. See id. at 1930 (noting that
recognition of privilege by all 50 states further strengthened Court's desire to
avoid frustrating purposes of state legislation that was enacted to foster confiden-
tial communications).
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/9
1998] NOTE
Also fundamental to the Jaffee Court's decision was its outright rejec-
tion of a balancing test approach that weighed the evidentiary need for
the information against a patient's privacy interests. 89 Emphasizing that
such an approach was unpredictable, Justice Stevens cited the Court's
holding in Upjohn to support the conclusion that an application of such a
balancing test would "eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."90
III. THE FACTS OF INRE SEALED CASE
On May 19, 1993, the White House carried out its controversial deci-
sion to fire seven employees in the Travel Office.9 1 Vincent W. Foster,
89. See id. at 1932 (contending that purpose of privilege would be thwarted if
confidentiality was premised upon trial judge's later evaluation of relative impor-
tance of patient's privacy interests and evidentiary need for disclosure). But see
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-12 (applying balancing test in executive privilege case to
determine if public's need for evidence outweighs President's need to have gen-
eral privilege of confidentiality over his Presidential communications). In Nixon,
the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for a subpoena duces tecum that required the
resident to produce certain tapes and documents concerning the President's con-
versations with his aides and advisors. See id. at 688. The President claimed execu-
tive privilege and filed a motion to quash the subpoena. See id. at 688. The district
court denied the President's motion and ordered the President or any subordinate
official in possession of the subpoenaed materials to deliver the materials to the
district court. See id. at 688-89.
In affirming the district court's holding, the Supreme Court stated that com-
munications between the President and his advisers are protected by a privilege
that emanates from separation of powers principles. See id. at 705 (stating that "the
privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own
assigned area of constitutional duties"). The Court noted, however, that the privi-
lege was not absolute, but qualified, and therefore it "must yield to the demon-
strated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id. at 713. In
arriving at this conclusion, the Nixon Court applied a balancing test in which the
Court "weighled] the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of
Presidential communications in performance of the President's responsibilities
against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal jus-
tice." Id. at 711-12.
90. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932. The Jaffee Court emphasized its holding in
Upjohn that if the purpose of the privilege is to be effectuated, the participants in
the conversation "must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which pur-
ports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little
better than no privilege at all." Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981)).
91. See Hearings Relating to Madison Guaranty S&L and the Whitewater Develop-
ment Corporation-Washington, DC Phase: Hearings Before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 186 (1994) [hereinafter Madison Guaranty
Hearings] (discussing circumstances behind Travel Office firing incident). Efforts
began shortly after the 1992 Presidential election to remove the long-standing
White House Travel Office employees. See H.R. REP. No. 104-849, at 11 (1996)
(discussing events leading up to Travel Office firings). President Clinton's cousin,
Catherine Cornelius, who had previously worked on travel arrangements during
the election campaign, contacted an Arkansas travel company, World Wide Travel,
in an effort to promote "out-sourcing" the travel operations at the White House.
See id. Before January 20, 1993, Cornelius met several times with White House
Administrator David Watkins and World Wide Travel representatives and submit-
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Deputy White House Counsel, was a central figure behind the Travel Of-
fice affair.9 2 In the weeks that followed the firings, Foster became increas-
ingly troubled by the Travel Office matter.93 Concerned that he might
ted several memos to Watkins regarding future travel arrangements. See id. In her
memos, Cornelius argued that the Travel Office was badly mismanaged and "overly
pro-press," and she asserted that she be named to head the office. See JAMES B.
STEWART, BLOOD SPORT 259-60 (1996) (discussing Cornelius' contentions). Harry
Thomason, a childhood friend of the President and an owner of an air charter
consulting company that had provided travel services to the Clinton-Gore cam-
paign, also alleged mismanagement and corruption in the Travel Office. See H.R.
REP. 104-849, at 11 (discussing President Clinton's long-standing relationship with
Thomason). Early in 1993, Thomason told the President and Mrs. Clinton of al-
leged wrongdoings in the Travel Office, arguing that the long-time career Travel
Office employees "should be replaced because they were disloyal." Id.
In mid-May 1993, after repeated allegations of mismanagement and corrup-
tion in the Travel Office, the White House ordered an FBI investigation as well as
an audit by an outside accounting firm to uncover any wrongdoings within the
Travel Office. See Madison Guaranty Hearings, supra, at 186-87 (discussing audit and
FBI investigation). Following a preliminary report by the accounting firm, the
White House proceeded to fire the employees. See id. at 187.
Evidence now supports that the Travel Office firings were not the result of
corruption by Travel Office employees, but rather the firings were part of an ex-
tensive campaign payback scheme. See H.R. REP. No. 104-849, at 28-88 (conclud-
ing that Travel Office firings were motivated by cronyism). The Travel Office
affair generated a wave of negative publicity for the Clinton White House. See, e.g.,
Ann Devroy & Ruth Marcus, Clinton Friend's Memo Sought Business; President's Cousin
Proposed Staffing Travel Office with Loyalists, WASH. PosT, May 22, 1993, at Al (con-
tending that White House had ulterior motives in firing Travel Office staff); White
House Follies: The Gang That Can't Fire Straight, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at 18
(stating that Travel Office firings made White House look "inept, callous and self-
serving").
92. See STEWART, supra note 91, at 258-78 (discussing Foster's role in handling
Travel Office firings). Before coming to Washington, Vincent Foster was a partner
in the Rose Law Firm. See Madison Guaranty Hearings, supra note 91, at 185 (dis-
cussing Foster's background). Among his partners at the Arkansas firm were Asso-
ciate Counsel William Kennedy and First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. See id.
Although Foster gave Associate Counsel William Kennedy direct control over the
Travel Office matter, Foster was responsible for overseeing the overall operation.
See id. at 187 (discussing Foster's role as supervisor). After consulting with Foster
and others within the White House, Kennedy hired an outside accounting firm to
audit the books of the Travel Office, and he also contacted the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) to determine whether a criminal investigation should take
place. See id.
In the days following the firings, the White House sought to make the FBI
issue a stronger statement about its investigation. See STEWART, supra note 91, at
266 (discussing FBI investigation). In accordance with its standard policies, the
FBI was preparing to issue a statement that read: "We understand that the results
of the audit of the White House Travel office will be referred to the FBI for our
review." Id. The White House, without any objections from Foster, persuaded the
FBI to add a sentence to its statement saying that there was "sufficient information
for the FBI to determine that additional criminal investigation is warranted." Id.
The White House was subsequently criticized for its interference with an FBI inves-
tigation. See id. (citing newspaper articles castigating White House for its mishan-
dling of FBI investigation into Travel Office fiasco).
93. See H.R. REp. No. 104-849, at 109-21 (noting that Foster was very troubled
by prospect of numerous congressional and criminal investigations into Travel Of-
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have acted illegally in his handling of the incident, Foster hired his own
attorney. 94 Portions of their conversations concerned Foster's involve-
fice firings). Foster's distress became so severe that he considered resigning from
his position. See Madison Guaranty Hearings, supra note 91, at 189.
Foster had become so upset about his involvement in the Travel Office firings
that he suffered an anxiety attack. See id. at 187. According to Foster's wife, "the
Travel Office matter was the greatest cause of Foster's stress and anxiety in the
weeks prior to his death." Id. Foster also felt personally responsible for the White
House's reprimand of Associate Counsel Kennedy for his handling of the Travel
Office fiasco and considered resigning from his post as Deputy White House Coun-
sel. See id. at 187-88.
94. See STEWART, supra note 91, at 273 (stating that Foster's notes "suggest he
was beginning to worry that he might even have violated some law"). Foster was
also deeply troubled that the criminal investigation into the Travel Office firings
could implicate President and Mrs. Clinton. See H.R. REP. 104-849, at 110. On
June 1, 1993, the FBI submitted its investigation report to the Attorney General.
See Madison Guaranty Hearings, supra note 91, at 187. The report contained state-
ments allegedly made by Associate Counsel Kennedy to FBI agents that the Travel
Office matter concerned those at "the highest levels" and "the highest level" at the
White House. H.R. REP. No. 104-849, at 110. Kennedy repeatedly denied making
such statements. See id. According to White House sources, Foster argued in vain
to exclude these statements from the White House Travel Office Management Re-
view because such statements opened the possibility that both Mrs. Clinton and the
President played a role in the firings. See id. (discussing Foster's distress at possible
implications for President and Mrs. Clinton).
Before the Travel Office firings, Foster met with Mrs. Clinton and the two
discussed how to handle the situation in the Travel Office. See STEWART, supra note
91, at 261. Foster's notes of the meeting indicate that Mrs. Clinton was interested
in the Travel Office matter: "What's going on? Are you [Foster] on top of it?" Id.
Mrs. Clinton has repeatedly denied that she suggested that the Travel Office staff
be replaced. See id. at 262 n.* (noting that Mrs. Clinton asserts she was not respon-
sible for firing of Travel Office staff). Contained in Foster's handwritten notebook
detailing the Travel Office affair are references to Mrs. Clinton and statements
such as "misuse of FBI" followed by "they deny" and "HR no role." H.R. RP. No.
104-849, at 111. Consequently, Foster may have been worried that Mrs. Clinton
might become involved in the "misuse of the FBI" issue. See id. (discussing Foster's
concerns about investigations into Hillary Clinton's possible involvement in misuse
of FBI). Foster was so concerned about the potential ramifications of the Travel
Office firings that he considered getting outside counsel for both President and
Mrs. Clinton. See id. at 109.
Foster was also highly concerned about controlling potential damage to the
Clintons from Whitewater. See Investigation of Whitewater Development Corporation and
Related Matters: Final Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Develop-
ment Corporation and Related Matters, S. REP. No. 104-280, at 23-33 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Whitewater Hearings] (discussing Foster's involvement in Clintons' personal
legal affairs). Whitewater was a failed land development deal entered into by the
Clintons and their partners James and Susan McDougal in which the Clintons lost
more than $46,000 by the time they sold their interest to McDougal for $1000 in
1992. See Macon Morehouse, Whitewater: A Primer; The Who, What, Why of a Tangled
Scandal; The Real Estate Deal, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., May 30, 1996, at A14 (providing
overview of participants and events behind Whitewater real estate development
plan); see also Navigating the Maze: Whitewater, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 2, 1996, at 27
(same); The Unfolding of Whitewater, WAsH. POST, Jan. 21, 1994, at A20 (same).
Foster was given the responsibility for overseeing the preparation of the
Clintons' 1992 tax returns to reflect properly the sale of their shares in Whitewater,
and he was worried that the returns might trigger an IRS audit. See Whitewater
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ment in the Travel Office firings and the decision to order a criminal in-
vestigation into the Travel Office staff.95 Two months after the dismissal
of the Travel Office employees, Foster was found dead in a park outside of
Washington, D.C., the victim of an apparent suicide.9 6
In the grand jury investigation into the White House Travel Office
firings, the Office of the Independent Counsel subpoenaed the notes that
Foster's attorney took during his conversation with Foster shortly before
Foster's suicide. 97 The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia quashed the subpoenas on the grounds that the notes of the con-
versation were protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the
Hearings, supra, at 28 (discussing Foster's role in preparing Clintons' tax returns).
Among the documents found in Foster's office at the time of his death was a file
on Whitewater and his notes of conversations with the Clintons' accountant con-
cerning the tax treatment of the sale of Whitewater. See id. at 25-29 (discussing
contents of Foster's office). Foster's notes stated that the Whitewater tax problem
was a "can of worms you shouldn't open." Id. at 28.
95. See Stephen Labaton, Foster Suicide a Test of Lawyer-Client Privilege, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at A17 (stating that Foster's friends and associates say that at
least part of conversation between Foster and his attorney involved issue of Travel
Office firings)
96. See Madison Guaranty Hearings, supra note 91, at 182. Foster apparently
shot himself in the head in Fort Marcy Park during the early evening of July 20,
1993. See id. at 183.
Foster's death has sparked a wave of literature among some observers who
contend that Foster was not the victim of a suicide, but rather the victim of a White
House cover-up. See, e.g., Reed Irvine & Joe Goulden, Unremitting Trail of Clues in
the Foster Suicide, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at D3 (questioning whether Foster
committed suicide); Ellen Joan Pollock, Vince Foster's Death Is a Lively Business for
Conspiracy Buffs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1995, at Al (discussing market created by
conspiracy buffs who believe Foster was murdered). See generally CHRis RUDDY, THE
STRANGE DEATH OF VINCENT FOSTER (1997) (contending Foster may have been
murdered). The secrecy of White House officials and the removal of objects from
Foster's office immediately following his death increased suspicions that Foster's
death was not a suicide. See H.R. REP. No. 104-849, at 121-86 (charging that White
House officials were responsible for cover-up and obstruction of justice after Fos-
ter's apparent suicide).
Despite the controversy, several different independent investigations each
have concluded that Foster's death resulted from suicide. See, e.g., Madison Guar-
anty Hearings, supra note 91, at 171-380 (concluding Foster committed suicide);
Laying Mr. Foster to Rest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1997 (stating that Office of Independ-
ent Counsel has finished latest report concluding Foster committed suicide).
97. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that Of-
fice of Independent counsel sought notes of conversation between Foster and his
attorney). Around late May or early June of 1993, Foster contacted his own attor-
ney out of his concern that he might have to testify before a congressional commit-
tee regarding the Travel Office affair. See STEWART, supra note 91, at 273 (stating
that "Foster's notebook jottings in some cases appear to be preparation for con-
gressional cross-examination").
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work-product doctrine. 98 On appeal by the Office of the Independent
Counsel, the D.C. Circuit reversed. 99
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
1. The Majority Opinion
In In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of whether the
attorney-client privilege terminates upon the death of the client. 100 First,
the majority opinion, written by Judge Williams, noted that the attorney-
client privilege applies to grand jury proceedings.10 l The majority then
referred to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which states that the
attorney-client privilege must be construed "in the light of reason and
experience."1
0 2
Having discussed the need to refer to precedent, the D.C. Circuit rec-
ognized that the prevailing rule is that the privilege survives the death of
the client.10 3 The majority noted, however, that the vast majority of cases
in which the privilege applied were cases that fell within the well-recog-
nized testamentary exception.' 0 4 Acknowledging the scarcity of nontesta-
mentary cases involving the privilege, the majority asserted that the
nontestamentary cases that actually applied the privilege provide little ex-
planation as to why the privilege applied. 10 5 Moreover, the majority noted
98. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231 (stating that United States District Court
for District of Columbia applied attorney-client privilege incorrectly).
99. See id. (reversing and remanding for further proceedings on grounds that
"the district court read both privileges too broadly").
100. See id. at 231-32 (addressing applicability of privilege in postdeath situa-
tions). The court also addressed the issue of whether the work-product doctrine
protected the notes of the conversation between the decedent and his attorney.
See id. at 235-37. For a discussion of the court's examination regarding the work-
product doctrine see infra note 117.
101. See id. at 231 (discussing whether privilege applied to grand jury pro-
ceedings). The parties both agreed that the communications in question would be
protected if the client were still living. See id,
102. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501). The court maintained that Rule 501
obligates courts to "observe[ ] precedent but at the same time try[ ], where prece-
dents are in conflict or not controlling, to find answers that best balance the pur-
poses of the relevant doctrines." Id.
103. See id. (stating that "[c]ourts have generally assumed that the privilege
survives death" and citing Frankel, supra note 11, at 47). The majority also cited to
modern evidence codes that permit personal representatives of a deceased client
to assert the privilege. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 127 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft 1996)). The court further recognized
that courts applied the privilege after the client's death in both grand jury pro-
ceedings and criminal trials. See id.
104. See id. (citing Frankel, supra note 11, at 58 n.65). Of 400 cases examined,
380 were cases involving testamentary disputes. See id. (providing statistics of cases
in which courts upheld attorney-client privilege after client's death).
105. See id. at 232 (asserting that "such cases as do actually apply [the privi-
lege] give little revelation of whatever reasoning may have explained the out-
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that most commentators support curtailing the privilege in cases in which
the client is deceased.' 0 6
The D.C. Circuit then focused its analysis on the policy rationale for
the privilege.' 0 7 Judge Williams recognized that the privilege serves two
functions: (1) it facilitates the provision of legal advice and (2) it ensures
the client's privacy.' 0 8 Nevertheless, the majority found that the privilege
hindered the truth-finding process and, therefore, must be construed nar-
rowly. 109 Acknowledging that a complete abandonment of the privilege
would impair the provision of legal services, the majority proposed that a
balancing test be used to determine the applicability of the privilege in
postdeath criminal cases. 110
Employing this balancing test, the D.C. Circuit weighed the dece-
dent's interest in preserving his reputation against the costs of protecting
come"). The majority criticized the rationale in Glover v. Patten, which is generally
cited for the proposition that the privilege survives death. See id. (contending
Glover is typical case that merely proposes that privilege survives death of client, but
finds it inapplicable to conflicts among persons "claiming under the client"). The
D.C. Circuit noted that the Glover Court's endorsement of the privilege in
nontestamentary situations was "rather tepid." Id. For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Glover, see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
The court also noted that "'there is little reason to preserve secrecy at the
expense of excluding relevant evidence after the estate is wound up and the repre-
sentative is discharged."' Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 954 cmt. (1997)). The court reasoned that the framing of the privilege as be-
longing to the deceased client's estate or personal representative indicates that the
privilege may cease on the winding up of the estate and reflects a primary focus on
civil litigation. See id. (discussing limitations of privilege in testamentary
situations).
106. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231 (citing examples of scholarly comment
that generally support curtailment of postdeath privilege). The majority stated
that only one commentator contended that there was "'no limit of time beyond
which the disclosures might not be used to the detriment of the client or of his
estate."' Id. (quoting WiGMoRE, supra note 2, § 2323, at 630-31). This view, how-
ever, has been sharply criticized by other legal scholars, including some who assert
that "'[o]ne would have to attribute a Pharaoh-like concern for immortality to
suppose that the typical client has much concern for how posterity may view his
communications."' Id. (quoting WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 23, § 5498, at
484).
107. See id. at 233 (discussing justifications for privilege).
108. See id. (discussing utilitarian and privacy rationales for privilege). The
court asserted, however, that "it seems fair to say that [privacy concerns] have
played at best a secondary role" in establishing the privilege. Id.
109. See id. (stating that "because the privilege obstructs the truth-finding pro-
cess, it is ... to be narrowly construed").
110. See id. (proposing application of balancing test). The court noted that
the goal of the privilege is to maximize the benefits of confidential communica-
tions between clients and attorneys, while simultaneously maximizing the truth-
seeking process. See id. The majority recognized further, however, that an abroga-
tion of the privilege would "clearly impair the provision of legal services," but at
the same time "its application renders judicial proceedings less accurate." Id.
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the decedent's communications after his death.11 The majority con-
cluded that in the realm of criminal litigation, the chilling effect would fall
"somewhere between modest and nil" if the privilege were to be abro-
gated.1 12 The proposition that postdeath revelations typically trouble the
client less than predeath revelations was central to the majority's
reasoning.1 13
Cognizant of the Supreme Court's holding in Jaffee, the majority lim-
ited their application of the balancing test solely to criminal litigation.
1 14
The majority asserted that a balancing test creates only "incremental com-
plication," and that the attorney-client privilege has never been free from
complication because it is not absolute. 115 To support this assertion, the
majority cited several exceptions, including the crime-fraud exception, the
intentional tort exception and the testamentary exception to the privi-
lege. 116 Finally, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the balancing test should
111. See id. (employing balancing test to determine if decedent's interests jus-
tify maintaining privilege).
112. Id. The D.C. Circuit contended that postdeath revelation would nor-
mally trouble the client less than predeath revelation, but the question depends on
how much less. See id. (arguing that client's posthumous reputation was of rela-
tively little importance to him). The majority determined that the answer is con-
tingent upon the circumstances. See id. As such, according to the majority,
criminal liability dies with the client, but civil liability continues, and "the same
impulses that drive people to provide for their families in life clearly create a mo-
tive to preserve their estates thereafter." Id.
113. See id. (discussing value of decedent's posthumous reputation). The
D.C. Circuit recognized that one's posthumous reputation will affect the dece-
dent's family, but the majority reasoned that "[i]n the sort of high-adrenalin situa-
tion likely to provoke consultation with counsel, however, we doubt if these
residual interests will be very powerful; and against them the individual may even
view history's claims to truth as more deserving." Id. For a discussion favoring
abrogation of the attorney-client privilege in postdeath situations for the benefit of
history, see Bonnie Hobbs, Laryers' Papers: Confidentiality Versus the Claims of His-
tory, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 179 (1992).
114. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234 (discussing limited application of balanc-
ing test). The court opined that "the fewer, and the more questionable the re-
maining resources (because of witnesses' interest or bias, for example), the
greater the relative value of what the deceased has told his lawyer." Id. Recogniz-
ing the Supreme Court's admonition in Jaffee against employing a balancing test
that yields varied results, the court restricted its holding, stating:
Although witness unavailability alone would not justify qualification of
the privilege, we think that unavailability through death, coupled with the
non-existence of any client concern for criminal liability after death, cre-
ates a discrete realm (use in criminal proceedings after death of the cli-
ent) where the privilege should not automatically apply. We reject a
general balancing test in all but this narrow circumstance.
Id.
115. See id. (noting that many communications which clients and lawyers be-
lieve to be privileged in fact are not) (citing EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATroRNEv-Cu-
ENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 3 (1997)).
116. See id. at 234-35 (discussing various exceptions to privilege). The court
noted that the privilege does not extend in cases in which the client seeks legal
advice to consummate a future illegal activity. See id. at 234. The court also indi-
cated that the exception does not apply when a client commits intentional torts.
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be used only in criminal proceedings in which the importance of the com-
munications sought is substantial. 117
2. The Dissent
Judge Tatel, in his dissent, strongly criticized the majority for its fail-
ure to provide sufficient reasoning in abandoning a privilege that courts
See id. The majority also discussed the exception for litigation between persons
who claim under the decedent, and noted that in many contexts the privilege
would not apply because it would be readily apparent at the outset of the attorney-
client communication whether the privilege applied. See id. (discussing inapplica-
bility of privilege in certain testamentary situations).
117. Id. at 235. The majority emphasized that the statements at issue "must
bear on a significant aspect of the crimes at issue" and an aspect as to which there
is little reliable evidence available. Id. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that this ap-
proach would limit release to when the risk of a chilling effect is minimal and the
cost of keeping such communications secret would be high. See id.
The majority also suggested that an in camera review by the district court of
the communications at issue should play a role in the application of the balancing
test. See id. (proposing that district court should use its discretion in examining
communications to see if they qualify for privileged status); see also United States v.
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-75 (1989) (holding that in camera review of allegedly
privileged communications may be used to ascertain whether communications fall
within crime-fraud exception to privilege); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
714-15 (1974) (ordering in camera review of Presidential communications to pre-
serve confidentiality). The D.C. Circuit noted that if the district court finds a con-
fidentiality interest, "it can take steps to limit access to these communications in a
way that is consonant with the analysis justifying relaxation of the privilege." Sealed
Case, 124 F.3d at 235.
In deciding on the work-product doctrine, the D.C. Circuit drew a distinction
between an attorney's notes that contained purely factual elements and notes that
revealed the attorney's opinions and thought processes. See id. at 235-36. The ma-
jority recognized that forcing an attorney to disclose notes about a client's oral
statements is disapproved of by the courts because it "'tends to reveal the attor-
ney's mental processes."' Id. at 236 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 399 (1981)). Consequently, the person who seeks such notes must show "ex-
traordinary justification." Id. at 235. The majority noted further, however, that
Upjohn did not establish whether the factual elements contained in the attorney's
notes should be granted the nearly absolute "extraordinary justification." Id. at
236 (contending that the reasoning in Upjohn suggests that such notes are analyti-
cally divisible).
The court in Sealed Case thus concluded that unless the factual material re-
flects the attorney's mental processes, the material should be obtainable by the
other party when true necessity is shown. See id. The court stated that
unless the general possibility that purely factual material may reflect the
attorney's mental processes (either in questioning or in recording) is
enough to shroud all lawyers' notes in the super-protective envelope re-
served by Rule 26(b)(3) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] for
,mental impressions,' we think such material should be reachable when
true necessity is shown.
Id.
Based on the evidence before it, the court concluded that the work-product
exception did not apply to the documents in their entirety. See id. at 236-37 (con-
tending that documents in question disclose portions containing factual material
that could be considered opinion only through an overly-expansive view of work-
product privilege).
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had widely recognized for centuries.1 18 The dissent's articulated rationale
for the privilege was that "[b]y preserving the privilege after the client's
death, the law ensures that the privacy afforded those who confide in
counsel extends to those who would otherwise take their secrets to the
grave." 119 Furthermore, Judge Tatel stated that the majority's balancing
test was not supported by case law, but instead by commentators whose
views have never been adopted by any court or legislature. 120 According
to the dissent, the majority's new balancing test will dissuade clients from
disclosing sensitive and potentially harmful information to their
attorneys.12
1
The dissent further noted that when the attorney-client privilege ap-
plies, it is not a qualified privilege and cannot be defeated by a showing of
need. 12 2 Moreover, "'[m]aking the promise of confidentiality contingent
upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the [cli-
ent's] interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would
eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."'1 2 3 Judge Tatel further criti-
118. See id. at 237 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority provides no
convincing reason for abrogation of privilege and noting privilege was deeply
rooted in English and American legal traditions).
119. Id. at 238 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel asserted that the privilege
encourages individuals to seek legal advice, and by doing so, the individual, the
legal system and society benefit. See id. (Tatel,J., dissenting) (discussing utilitarian
justification for attorney-client privilege). As the dissent stated:
"The subjective freedom of the client, which it is the purpose of the privi-
lege to secure . . .could not be attained if the client understood that,
when the relation ended or even after the client's death, the attorney
could be compelled to disclose the confidences, for there is no limit of
time beyond which the disclosures might not be used to the detriment of
the client or of his estate."
Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting WiGMORE, supra note 2, § 2323, at 630-31).
120. See id. at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting). The dissent also asserted that
although the court relied on the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,
the majority failed to acknowledge the Restatement's admonition that "'no court
or legislature has adopted'" a posthumous exception to the common law rule. Id.
(Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAw-
YERs § 127 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft 1996)).
121. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (discussing chilling effect majority's balanc-
ing approach will have on attorney-client communications).
122. See id. at 239-40 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (contending clients need to know
with some degree of certainty when privilege applies). Judge Tatel asserted that
"'[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.'"
Id. at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
123. Id. at 240 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct.
1923, 1932 (1996)). Judge Tatel opined that the testamentary exception and the
crime-fraud exception mentioned by the majority differ greatly from the balancing
test adopted by court. See id. at 240 (Tatel, J., dissenting). According to Judge
Tatel, in these two situations the clients are aware at the outset of the meeting that
the statements they make are unprotected by the privilege. See id. (Tatel, J., dis-
senting) (distinguishing testamentary and crime-fraud exceptions). Furthermore,
an attorney cannot foresee whether a client's statement might some day pertain to
a criminal investigation, much less whether a court employing the balancing test
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cized the majority for its failure to acknowledge the potential significance
of posthumous revelations of confidences on an individual's reputa-
tion. 124 Specifically, he argued that the majority's assumption of the irrel-
evance of one's posthumous reputation "defies both common sense and
experience."'125
Judge Tatel also emphasized that although the privilege may result in
loss of information, the common law has long recognized that the legal
system benefits from the recognition of the privilege after the client's
death. 126 These benefits outweigh whatever detriment might result from
denying information to the fact finder in a particular case.' 27 The dissent
also chastised the court for its failure to recognize the viability of the com-
mon law rule in the states.128 In concluding his dissent, Judge Tatel de-
will decide at some later date that the information "bear[s] on a significant aspect
of the crimes at issue." Id. (Tatel,J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Consequently,
according to the dissent, the majority's balancing test is precisely the type of nebu-
lous strategy that the Supreme Court was seeking to avoid in Jaffee and Upjohn. See
id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
124. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that rationale of common law rec-
ognizes that clients are greatly concerned about their posthumous reputations).
125. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel noted that libraries, charitable
foundations, schools, universities, scholarships, sports arenas and even acts of Con-
gress bearing the names of their benefactors, authors, or sponsors all stand as a
testament to the fact that individuals are greatly concerned about their posthu-
mous reputations. See id. (Tatel,J., dissenting) (examining various situations illus-
trating people's concern for their posthumous reputations). Moreover, that
people write wills, purchase life insurance, convey property, finance their chil-
dren's education and make guardianship arrangements indicates that human be-
ings care deeply about their surviving friends and family. See id. (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (discussing various safeguards that individuals create during their life-
time to provide for welfare of their loved ones). Judge Tatel asserted that limiting
the privilege after a client's death will adversely affect the decisions of not only
those persons who have a significant interest in their posthumous reputation, but
also of persons who are aged, seriously ill or suicidal. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that people other than those who are deeply concerned about their
reputations may be adversely affected by abrogation of privilege). The dissent de-
clares further that the facts of the instant case are proof of the value that a person
can place on reputation. See id. at 241 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he
facts of the present case vividly illustrate the value a person can place on
reputation").
126. See id. at 241 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that common law "long ago
determined that the benefits the legal system gains through recognizing the privi-
lege posthumously outweigh whatever damage might flow from denying informa-
tion to the factfinder in a particular case").
127. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (discussing benefits that application of privi-
lege in postdeath situations provide to legal system). The dissent proposed that if
limiting the scope of the privilege deters candor and openness in attorney-client
communications, it is possible that much of the information that the other side
seeks would not have come into being in the first place. See id. (noting that
"' [w] ithout a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants ... seek
access . . . is unlikely to come into being"' (quotingJaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929)).
128. See id. at 242 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (criticizing court's failure to consider
state common law rule that privilege survives death of client). The dissent noted
that "[i]t is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy determinations by state
[Vol. 43: p. 285
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clared that the majority's balancing test "strikes a fundamental blow to the
attorney-client privilege andjeopardizes its benefits to the legal system and
society."1' 2
9
B. Critical Analysis
In Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit failed to recognize the importance of
preserving the attorney-client privilege after the client's death. Although
the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that a wholesale abrogation of the privilege
would have deleterious effects on the legal system, the majority nonethe-
less proceeded to apply the type of balancing test that the Jaffee Court
prohibited.1 30 Moreover, in carving out its new exception to the privilege,
the D.C. Circuit disregarded long-standing state law traditions that apply
the privilege posthumously.13 1 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit's holding
in Sealed Case was a misguided attempt to create a new exception to an
ancient privilege.
132
1. The Balancing Test Applied
The balancing test set forth by the D.C. Circuit contravenes the prin-
ciples underlying the attorney-client privilege. 138 According to the
Supreme Court in Upjohn, for the attorney-client privilege to serve its pur-
pose, "the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.1 34 The balanc-
legislatures as reflecting both 'reason' and 'experience.'" Id. (Tatel,J., dissenting)
(quoting Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930). Judge Tatel added that the adoption of the
common law rule regarding the postdeath survival of the privilege by the Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee, and the committees that drafted the Model Code of
Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence further supports the position that the
common law rule of the states should have been adopted by the majority in the
present case. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (discussing adoption of common law
rule by Supreme Court's Advisory Committee).
129. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
130. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932 (rejecting balancing test implemented by
court of appeals and several states). The D.C. Circuit recognized that "dispensing
with the privilege altogether would presumably have negative results." Sealed Case,
124 F.3d at 233. The majority noted further that any rule that restricts the privi-
lege will cause clients to confide less in their attorneys and thus impair the provi-
sion of legal services. See id. (discussing adverse effects of total elimination of
attorney-client privilege).
131. For a discussion of how the states apply the attorney-client privilege post-
humously in nontestamentary contexts, see supra notes 46-61 and accompanying
text.
132. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 239 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (stating that no case
law supports majority's exception to attorney-client privilege and that majority ba-
ses its decision on views of commentators whose views have not been accepted by
any court or legislature). For a discussion of the general rule regarding posthu-
mous application of the attorney-client privilege in nontestamentary contexts, see
supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of the policy and principles of the attorney-client privi-
lege, see supra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
134. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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ing test set forth by the Sealed Case majority makes application of the privi-
lege contingent upon ajudge's later finding that the evidentiary needs for
disclosure outweigh the interests of the client.135 As Judge Tatel empha-
sized in his dissent, clients will be less forthcoming in their communica-
tions with their counsel because they will not know whether such
communications will be protected. 1
36
By limiting the exception to the realm of criminal litigation, the ma-
jority contended that it would eliminate the uncertainty that had so con-
cerned the Supreme Court in Upjohn and Jaffee.137 Nevertheless, "any
balancing approach to the privilege after the client has died is indeed
likely to result in 'vague standards.'" 138 Such a result occurs because the
individual trial judge has little reason to evaluate the effect that disclosure
will have on a deceased party-a party obviously not present in the
courtroom. 
139
In creating its exception to the privilege, the D.C. Circuit acknowl-
edged thatJaffee rejected application of a balancing test; nevertheless, the
majority adopted the very type of case-by-case balancing test that the Jaffee
Court had rejected. 140 The D.C. Circuit proffered evidentiary need as one
of the primary justifications for applying a balancing test.14 1 Long-stand-
ing common law traditions, however, do not support the majority's propo-
135. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233, 235 (contending that judge must decide
whether decedent's privacy interests outweigh prosecution's right to evidence and
noting that in camera review may play role in application of balancing test).
136. See id. at 240 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's balancing test
is uncertain and will dissuade clients from being fully candid with their attorneys).
137. See id. at 234 (discussing Supreme Court's rejection of ambiguous limita-
tions to privilege in Upjohn and Jaffee and stating that "[w] e ... embrace the argu-
ments for [applying a balancing test] only within the discrete zone of criminal
litigation").
138. Frankel, supra note 11, at 68 (emphasis added).
139. See id. at 68-70 (arguing that interests of trial court will be in conflict with
interests of absent parties who are or might be affected by judge's ad hoc rule of
applying privilege). One of the primary reasons for this result is that the informa-
tion a client will be most hesitant to tell an attorney in the absence of the privilege
will likely be the very information that a judge will deem significant. See id. at 69.
Consequently, under a balancing approach, a judge may find that the decedent's
interests are outweighed by societal interests in obtaining relevant evidence. See id.
(discussing undesirable aspects of public policy balancing approach).
140. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234 (acknowledging thatJaffee rejected ambig-
uous balancing test approach for psychotherapist-patient privilege and noting Jaf-
fee Court's admonition that uncertain privilege or one that leads to varying results
is little better than none at all). Despite this acknowledgment, the D.C. Circuit
adopted a balancing test that balances the public's need for evidence with the
decedent's interests in keeping communications secret. See id. (contending that
need for what client told his lawyer becomes greater when remaining sources of
evidence become more scarce, and this dearth of available resources coupled with
"the non-existence of any client concern for criminal liability after death" permits
application of balancing test in this instance).
141. See id. (stating that "the fewer, and the more questionable the remaining
sources... the greater the relative value of what the deceased has told his lawyer").
The court noted that the unavailability of the witness combined with a lack of
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sition that evidentiary need can overcome the attorney-client privilege.' 4 2
In contrast to the majority's position, the common law has long held that,
once the privilege applies, it is absolute and thus cannot be overcome by a
showing of need.' 43
The majority's claim that the privilege leads to a loss of information is
also largely unsupported by the common law.' 4 4 Rather than restrict the
flow of information, the attorney-client privilege creates new information
by encouraging clients to be more candid with their attorneys.145 In addi-
tion, the D.C. Circuit's "information loss" argument ignores one of the
strongest justifications for establishment of the privilege. 146 Specifically,
the costs resulting from the loss of relevant facts in court are justified by
the societal interest in encouraging clients to be candid with their attor-
neys.1 47 The John Doe court cogently summarized the utilitarian justifica-
concern for criminal liability on the part of the deceased client created a narrow
area of exception in which the privilege does not automatically apply. See id.
142. See LAM.IN, supra note 41, § 2.01, at 2-8, 2-9 (stating that "once the privi-
lege has been held applicable, information protected thereunder may not be the
subject of compelled disclosure regardless of the need or good cause shown for
such disclosure"); Daisy Hurst Floyd, A "Delicate And Difficult Task": Balancing the
Competing Interests of Federal Rule of Evidence 612, The Work Product Doctrine, and the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 44 Burr. L. REv. 101, 116 (1996) (stating that "the attorney-
client privilege is not overcome by application of a balancing test").
143. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc. 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992)
(stating that documents within scope of privilege are "zealously protected"); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that if policy
of promoting client disclosure is to be promoted, privilege cannot be abridged);
United States v. Board of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 695, 701 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating that
attorney-client privilege is absolute when it applies).
144. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (stating that
"[w]ithout a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants... seek
access . . . is unlikely to come into being").
145. For a discussion regarding the amount of potential evidence actually
produced by the attorney-client privilege, see supra note 30.
146. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 241-42 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority's balancing test will create chilling effect that will cause clients to reveal
less information to their attorneys, thereby preventing justice system from func-
tioning effectively). Judge Tatel asserted that the majority's contention that the
attorney-client privilege leads to loss of information is unsupported by prior case
law and by the views of legal commentators. See id. at 241 (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(citing Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66
VA. L. REv. 597 (1980)). Moreover, limiting the "information loss" argument to
cases in which the client has died may not be feasible. See id. (noting that fact
finder can also be denied information by witnesses who are unable to remember
facts, incompetent to testify or outside of court's jurisdiction).
147. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating
privilege "recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends");
United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that sound
legal advice can serve public ends and privilege plays key role in providing effective
legal advice); United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting
protections provided by privilege are strongest when client seeks attorney's advice
to determine legality of conduct before taking any legal action). For a further
discussion regarding the utilitarian rationale and societal benefits that the attor-
ney-client privilege provides, see supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
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tion for the privilege when it stated that "the client's and the public's
interests are best served by a rule of confidentiality that applies both
before and after the death of the client."1
48
Also .intrinsic to the Sealed Case court's application of the balancing
test was the notion that the client's posthumous reputation would be of
little significance to him after his death. 14 9 Such a proposition is at odds
with social realities that indicate individuals are genuinely concerned
about their posthumous reputations. 1 50  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit's
proposition likewise failed to consider the well-established traditions of
the legal system in protecting a client's reputation after their death.1
5 1
Perhaps most significantly, the majority misapplied the law to the
facts of the case.' 52 Contrary to the court's suggestion that individuals are
largely indifferent to the effects that posthumous disclosure of confi-
dences could have on their reputations, Foster was highly concerned
148. In re'John Doe GrandJury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 71 (Mass. 1990).
149. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233 (contending that risk of postdeath disclo-
sures will typically disturb client less than disclosures while client is alive).
150. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 61-63 (noting that expenditure of vast
amounts of energy and resources by individuals for their burials reflects their inter-
est in preserving their good name and reputation following their death). More-
over, if individuals were unconcerned with their reputations, including after their
death, their moral and legal behavior would likely be worse while they were alive.
See id. at 62-63 (presenting normative argument to support proposition that indi-
viduals are concerned about their posthumous reputations).
151. See id. at 63 (citing Martin v. Shaen, 156 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1945)). In
deciding whether to apply the privilege in a testamentary context, the court in
Martin carefully considered whether the disclosure of communications between
the deceased client and his attorney would tarnish the reputation of the client. See
id. at 63, n.91 (stating that attorney-client privilege "'may be waived by the per-
sonal representative or the heir of the deceased person, particularly where the disclo-
sure would not injuriously affect the character or reputation of the decedent"' (emphasis
added) (quoting Martin, 156 P.2d at 684)); see also Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co.,
357 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Super. 1976) (determining whether confidence between
deceased client and his attorney contained information that would damage reputa-
tion of decedent). Before it ultimately decided not to apply the privilege to the
decedent's conversation with his attorney, the court in Cohen emphasized that the
testimony sought from the lawyer did "not contain scandalous and impertinent
matter which would serve to blacken the memory of [the decedent]." Id.
That the law protects the reputation of the decedent is also reflected in the
adoption by many states of survival statutes that allow the decedent's estate to
bring tort causes of action on behalf of the decedent. See Frankel, supra note 11, at
63 n.95 (noting that "survival statutes gradually are being extended; and it may be
expected that ultimately all tort actions will survive to the same as those founded
on contract" (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 126, at 901 (4th ed. 1971))); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1996) (per-
mitting executors and administrators to have cause of action "for any trespass done
to the person or property, real or personal, of their testator or intestate against the
trespasser" and allowing executor or administrator to recover damages on behalf
of decedent).
152. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 240-41 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (contending indi-
viduals are highly concerned about their reputations and that it would be highly
inappropriate in this particular case to eliminate common law's posthumous pro-
tection provided by attorney-client privilege).
[Vol. 43: p. 285
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss1/9
1998] NOTE
about ensuring the posterity of his reputation. 153 As the dissent vigorously
argued, " [t] he facts of the present case vividly illustrate the value a person
can place on reputation."1
5 4
2. The D.C. Circuit's Roection of State Law Traditions
In creating its exception to the attorney-client privilege, the D.C. Cir-
cuit also failed to acknowledge that the posthumous recognition of the
privilege outside of the testamentary context appears to be the law in all
states.15 5 The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that the policy deci-
sions of the states affect the decision of federal courts to establish a new
privilege or curtail coverage of an extant one.1 56 As the Jaffee Court em-
phasized, "it is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy determina-
153. See Madison Cuaranty Hearings, supra note 91, at 2028-30 (providing ex-
cerpt of Foster's commencement speech regarding significance of reputation). At
a commencement speech given to the University of Arkansas School of Law in
1993, Foster impressed upon his audience the supreme importance of establishing
and maintaining an exemplary reputation:
You will be evaluated ... by your product, your energy, your tempera-
ment and your backbone. The reputation you develop for intellectual
and ethical integrity will be your greatest asset or your worst enemy. You
will be judged by your judgment.
Practice law with excellence, with pride in your product. Treat every
pleading, every brief, every contract, every letter, every daily task as if your
career will be judged on it.
Each client is entitled to your best effort .... The clients you repre-
sent will remember you long after you have forgotten their names.
I cannot make this point to you too strongly. There is no victory, no
advantage, no fee, no favor which is worth even a blemish on your reputa-
tion for intellect and integrity.
Nothing travels faster than an accusation that another lawyer's word
is no good.
Id. at 2028, 2029. Foster's concern for his reputation is likewise evidenced by his
suicide note in which he states that in Washington, "ruining people is considered a
sport." Id. at 2537.
154. Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 241 (Tatel, J. dissenting).
155. See id. at 242 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (maintaining that posthumous appli-
cation of privilege outside of testamentary context "appears to have been em-
braced by every state that has codified the privilege and remains the law in those
that have not"). Few state statutes that codify the attorney-client privilege directly
address posthumous application of the privilege, but those statutes and evidence
rules which mention the testamentary exception suggest by negative implication
that the privilege should continue after the client's death. See Frankel, supra note
11, at 55 n.52.
156. See, e.g.,Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1929-30 (1996) (stating that
"policy decisions of the States bear on the question whether federal courts should
recognize a new privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one"); United
States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368 n.8 (1980) (citing Trammel for proposition that
federal courts should consider state law in deciding whether to retain or expand
privileges in federal court system); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 45, 48-50
(1980) (referring to state law to support curtailment of spousal immunity privilege
so that witness-spouse alone has privilege to testify adversely).
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tions by state legislatures as reflecting both 'reason' and 'experience.'" 157
The D.C. Circuit, however, failed to heed the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion and did not adequately consider the laws of the states regarding pos-
thumous application of the attorney-client privilege.15 8
The D.C. Circuit's decision to terminate the attorney-client privilege
upon the death of the client in the context of criminal litigation repre-
sents a significant curtailment of the privilege. Had the majority properly
applied the principles set forth in Upjohn and Jaffee, it would have ruled
that the attorney-client privilege applied to the communications made be-
tween Foster and his attorney. 15 9 Moreover, the fact that the state courts
apply the privilege posthumously further supports the argument that the
D.C. Circuit should have upheld the privilege.1 60 Instead, the majority
relied "on views of commentators never accepted by any court or
legislature." 161
V. IMPACT
The ramifications of the D.C. Circuit's opinion are troubling.1 62 At a
minimum, the D.C. Circuit's decision illustrates that the attorney-client
privilege is not as strong as many in the profession may have previously
believed.1 63 The balancing test proposed by the majority undermines the
element of certainty necessary for the effectiveness of the privilege.' 64
157. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1930 (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371,
376-81 (1933)).
158. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231-35 (failing to consider laws of states which
applied privilege posthumously).
159. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holdings in Jaffee and Upjohn,
see supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the posthumous application of the attorney-client
privilege by the state courts, see supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
161. Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
162. See Marcia Coyle, D.C. Circuit Trims Client Privilege; Court Says Attorney-Cli-
ent Shield Doesn't Survive Death, NAT'L L.J., Sept, 15, 1997, at Al (noting that one
scholar feels that D.C. Circuit's opinion signifies erosion of attorney-client privi-
lege); RobertJ. Morvillo, The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2,
1997, at 3 (same); Labaton, supra note 95, at A17 (discussing views of several com-
mentators who believe that D.C. Circuit's holding will discourage clients from be-
ing more open and candid with their attorneys). But see, Labaton, supra note 95, at
A17 (discussing Professor Wolfram's view that Sealed Case holding will not adversely
impact attorney-client relations and that creation of new exception to privilege by
D.C. Circuit was necessary because investigators often have no other means of ob-
taining information from dead persons).
In addition, one commentator contends that courts will be most apt to apply a
balancing test approach in precisely those situations in which the client would be
most concerned about disclosure, namely potential criminal exposure for family
and long-time friends. See Coyle, supra, at Al (discussing potential pitfall of D.C.
Circuit's balancing test approach).
163. See EPsTEIN, supra note 115, at 3 (stating which "[m]any communications
that clients and lawyers mistakenly believed are privileged in fact are not").
164. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 338, 393 (1981) (asserting that
privilege that is uncertain in its application is little better than no privilege at all).
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Consequently, the test employed by the majority may result in the type of
chilling effect in attorney-client communications that the Supreme Court
has expressly tried to avoid. 165 Moreover, the fact that the D.C. Circuit
employed a balancing test may encourage other courts to employ balanc-
ing tests in situations beyond the realm to which the majority has con-
fined its holding.l 66 As a consequence of this decision, attorneys now
have the obligation to inform their clients of the possible implications of
their discussions in the event of the client's death. 167
Ultimately, the Supreme Court may elect to review the D.C. Circuit's
decision in Sealed Case. The Court will be forced to decide whether the
majority's need-based analysis should stand despite well-established state
court precedent to the contrary.168 In light of the D.C. Circuit's question-
able application of both state and Supreme Court precedent, the Court
will likely invalidate the exception to the attorney-client privilege created
by the D.C. Circuit. Such a holding is necessary to restore the attorney-
client privilege to the place it has held in the common law legal system
since the sixteenth century.' 69
Casey Nix
165. SeeJaffee v. Redmond, 1923 S. Ct. 1923, 1929 (1996) (asserting that if
psychotherapist-patient privilege was rejected, conversations between patient and
his or her psychotherapist "would surely be chilled"); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888) (stating that privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the inter-
est and administration ofjustice, or the aid of persons having knowledge of the law
and skilled in practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of
when free from the consequences of the apprehension of disclosure").
166. See Coyle, supra note 162, at Al (stating that scholars are concerned that
D.C. Circuit's balancing test may create "slippery slope" that might encourage
courts to balance in other situations such as when client has not died, but is in-
stead temporarily incompetent).
167. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting that lawyers
must provide clients with new warning when advising them about confidentiality).
According to Judge Tatel, attorneys will now have to advise their clients that
whatever they reveal to the attorney in confidence could possibly be disclosed pub-
licly at a later date:
I cannot represent you effectively unless I know everything. I will hold all
our conversations in the strictest of confidence. But when you die, I could
be forced to testify-against your interests-in a criminal investigation or trial,
even of your friends or family, if the court decides that what you tell me is impor-
tant to the prosecution. Now, please tell me the whole story.
Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
168. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 94, at 227 (noting that general rule in
nearly all courts is that attorney-client privilege will survive death of client outside
of testamentary context).
169. See Morvillo, supra note 162, at 3 (stating that various bar associations are
fighting encroachments upon attorney-client privilege by judges and prosecutors,
"and it is hoped that their efforts will be rewarded by renewed reverence to the
values served by the privilege").
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